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SUMMARY
This article aims to interpret the term “unlawful threat” under Article 245 of the Criminal Code. 
It can be observed that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court and legal doctrine do not provide 
a uniform interpretation of the term. The work discusses whether the result in the shape of a justified 
concern that the threat will be carried out is necessary. Such a criminal result is described in Article 190 
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both a threat described in Article 190 of the Criminal Code and a threat to institute 
criminal proceedings or disseminate defamatory information concerning the person 
threatened or their next of kin constitute an unlawful threat. Article 190 § 1 of the 
Code defines statutory features of the so-called punishable threat, when a person 
threatens another person to commit an offence detrimental to that person or their 
next of kin if the threat causes in the threatened person a justified fear that it will 
be carried out. The distinction between a punishable threat and an unlawful threat 
is made in legal jargon and, hence, is not directly rooted in the Act.
Such legal background calls for analysing a significant problem of the interpre-
tation of statutory features of an unlawful threat under Article 245 of the Criminal 
Code. In this scope, it should be considered whether the result  in the shape of 
a justified fear of carrying out the threat to commit a crime belongs solely to the 
catalogue of statutory features of a punishable threat under Article 190 § 1 of the 
Criminal Code or whether it also completes the statutory features of a criminal 
offence under Article 245 of the Criminal Code pursuant to the reference made in 
the definition of an unlawful threat in Article 115 § 12 of the Code. This problem 
also has further implications. Answering the question posed in the title hereof 
may greatly impact analysing statutory features of other criminal offences, as the 
term “unlawful threat” is used in a number of definitions of prohibited acts under 




criminal proceedings or to disseminate defamatory information concerning the 
person threatened or their next of kin, occur.













Possible interpretations of the provisions raising similar questions were most 
comprehensibly presented in the Supreme Court Order of March 27, 2014, I KZP 














kin). The above-mentioned opinion distinguishes between “unlawful threat” and 
“punishable threat” and acknowledges that a justified fear that the threat will be 














2 See: M. Mozgawa, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, red. M. Mozgawa, Warszawa 2012, p. 268; 
idem, [in:] System Prawa Karnego,  t. 10: Przestępstwa przeciwko dobrom indywidualnym, red. 
J. Warylewski, Warszawa 2013, p. 417; K. Nazar-Gutowska, Groźba bezprawna w polskim prawie 
karnym, Warszawa 2012, pp. 61–72.









the threat will be carried out also if the threat does not fall under Article 190 § 1 of 
the Criminal Code4. Such direction would require corrective interpretation by the 
Supreme Court supporting functional interpretation. A different view on criminal 
coercion can be observed in the decision of the Supreme Court of 14 February 
2013, II KK 120/125. Pursuant to this decision, an unlawful threat under Article 
191 § 1 of the Criminal Code must be real, that is it must evoke a conviction in an 
objective observer that using it can lead to a certain behaviour of the threatened 












a threat to institute criminal proceedings or disseminate defamatory information). An unlawful threat 




3 Cf. e.g. B. Kunicka-Michalska, [in:] Kodeks karny. Część szczególna, red. A. Wąsek, R. Zawłocki, 
t. 2, Warszawa 2010, p. 377; W. Wróbel, A. Wojtaszczyk, W. Zontek, [in:] System Prawa Karnego, t. 8: 
Przestępstwa przeciwko państwu i dobrom zbiorowym, red. L. Gardocki, Warszawa 2013, p. 689; 
M. Jachimowicz, Przestępstwo zmuszania świadka, „Przegląd Sądowy” 2007, nr 11–12, p. 152.
4 Cf. J. Majewski, [in:] Kodeks karny. Część ogólna. Komentarz, red. A. Zoll, t. 1, Warszawa 2012, 
pp. 1396–1397; S. Hypś, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz, red. A. Grześkowiak, Warszawa 2012, p. 662; 









An Unlawful Threat as a Statutory Feature of Criminal Offences Under Article 245… 41
The above-mentioned Order of the Supreme Court No. I KZP 2/14 refusing 
to answer the same legal question, does, however, include obiter dicta of certain 
interpretation of Article 245 in relation to Article 115 § 12 of the Criminal Code. 





















elections and gatherings. The Supreme Court also noted that in such cases the indi-






















the defendant will be carried out7.
Most recently, the Supreme Court presented a similar standpoint in its order of 
September 14, 2017, I KZP 7/17 saying that the term “a threat defined in Article 














Supreme Court discussed the catalogue of legally protected interests and different 





quired for threats to commit criminal offence and not for the two remaining threats.
Here, it should be emphasised that the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court 
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according to which “an offence under Article 245 of the Criminal Code is a type of 
formal offence and the result in the shape of causing a justified fear that the threat 
will be carried out does not belong to its statutory features. It does not, however, 
mean that the Court can resign from establishing whether the threat was real”12.
Court of Appeal in Lublin in the judgement of October 3, 2013, II AKa 152/1313, 
also did not support the view that causing a justified fear is required for establish-
ing criminal liability for a threat to commit a criminal offence under Article 245 
of the Criminal Code. The Court thought that such a view is based on wrongly 













as a means of tampering a witness within the meaning of Article 245 of the Crim-
inal Code. According to the Court, as a criminal offence under Article 245 does 
not require any criminal consequence to occur, causing a justified fear that the 
threat will be carried out mentioned in Article 190 § 1 of the Criminal Code is not 
a condition for its penalisation.
Similarly, according to the decision of Court of Appeal in Lublin of September 6, 
2012, II AKa189/1214, analysing Article 115 § 12 of the Criminal Code and Article 190 
§ 1 of the same Code leads to a conclusion that the relation between the two provisions 
can be described as an “incomplete symmetry”, which merely defines the behaviour 
of the perpetrator and not the feelings of the aggrieved party. The Court drew our 
attention to different functions of these provisions. As the Court argues, Article 115 









Code “a threat mentioned in Article 190” concerns merely a subjective aspect of the 
behaviour of the perpetrator; Article 115 § 12 does not contain the requirement of 
causing a justified fear and the wording of Article 245 (and other provisions containing 
statutory features of a threat) does not require the existence of a justified fear that 
the threat will be carried out in a witness or other persons mentioned in the Article. 
Such a view on Article 245 of the Criminal Code, according to the Court, is also 
supported by systematic and purposive interpretation of this provision, as Article 245 
constitutes lex specialis in relation to Article 191 § 1 and can be found in the chapter 
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kin causing a justified fear that it will be carried out or a threat to institute criminal 








on “Principles of Legislative Technique”16. According to § 156 thereof, “references 
in a normative act can be used for achieving brevity or ensuring legal coherence”. 
According to § 156(2) “if the reference is used only to achieve brevity, the ref-
erenced provision or provisions shall be unambiguously indicated”. It should be 
stated that the reference made in Article 115 § 12 of the Criminal Code is dynamic 
within the meaning of § 159 of “Principles of Legislative Technique”, as the Act 







by the criminal offence.
The denotation of this term is complex – it is created by a legislative technique 
called internal reference – made within the same legal act (therefore, the legislator 





and statutory features of an unlawful threat outlined.
16 Journal of Laws 2016, Item 283.
17 Cf. M. Dębska, Komentarz do § 156 rozporządzenia w sprawie „Zasad techniki prawodaw-
czej”, LEX/el. 2013; G. Wierczyński, Komentarz do § 156 rozporządzenia w sprawie „Zasad techniki 
prawodawczej”, LEX/el. 2009.
18 Cf. M. Błachut, W. Gromski, J. Kaczor, Technika prawodawcza, Warszawa 2008, pp. 32–33.








































19 S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, O korespondencji dyrektyw redagowania i interpretowania 
tekstu prawnego, „Studia Prawnicze” 1985, nr 3–4, pp. 301 ff.
20 S. Wronkowska, Prawodawca racjonalny jako wzór dla prawodawcy faktycznego, [in:] Szkice 
z teorii prawa i szczegółowych nauk prawnych, red. S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Poznań 1990, 
pp. 118 ff.
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that the subjective element does not belong to statutory features also in the case of 
offences under Article 190 of the Criminal Code (second option) or that it belongs 
to all types of unlawful threats (first option). A hypothesis may be put forward that 
a legal gap is present also in the case of threats to institute criminal proceedings 
or disseminate defamatory information. Its existence may be caused by two kinds 
of circumstances.









carried out is essential under Article 190 of the Criminal Code and possibly when 
statutory features mentioned in Article 190 are the components of other criminal 
offences, excluding the offences against public interest. At this point, the place-
ment of Article 245 in the Criminal Code (and analogically, other unlawful threats 








between offences against an individual and collective interest is functionally val-
uable, as it considers legal interest in the process of decoding statutory features of 
offences. However, it cannot be ignored that both code-based systematics and the 
perspective of a rational legislator can lead to at least an attempt to argue with such 
an approach. In the end, the functional interpretation suggested by the Supreme 
Court (considering the ambiguous results of linguistic and systematic interpreta-
21 T. Spyra, Granice wykładni prawa. Znaczenie językowe tekstu prawnego jako granica wykład-
ni, Kraków 2006, pp. 31 ff.









corrective interpretation deserves our approval. This approach stipulates that every 
unlawful threat mentioned in Article 115 § 12, and not only a punishable threat, 
must cause a justified fear that it will be carried out. Only such interpretation will 
establish order in terminology and serve to achieve coherence in enforcing law by 
the Supreme Court. It should be repeated that such interpretation is creative in na-
ture and it refers only to the general part of the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, deep 




importance of the distinction between individual and public interest in the process 










tion of such an assumption is clearly visible in the case of an attempted offence 
with criminal result. The reasoning “from result to causes” cannot be used and 
drastically reveals the injustice of the solution adopted by the legislator. It is even 
more apparent in coercion without a criminal result, where “from result to causes” 
reasoning is absolutely impermissible. This helplessness towards legislative incon-




At this point, it should be reminded that per non est interpretation of the frag-
ment of Article 190 § 1 of the Criminal Code is impermissible. It means that, at 













indication of a subjective element.
Furthermore, assuming that the qualification of an unlawful threat under Ar-
ticle 190 of the Criminal Code requires causing a justified fear that the threat will 
be carried out and that it is not required in unlawful threats to institute criminal 
proceedings or disseminate defamatory information leads to conclusions, which 
are axiologically unacceptable. It  turns out that  in such a situation, a criminal 






It states that the difference between a punishable threat and an unlawful threat is 
quantitative, and not qualitative. The essence of both types of threat is, in fact, the 
same and the difference is that the two remaining cases of unlawful threats are not 
described separately in the specific part of the Criminal Code, but are included in 
the scope of prohibited acts involving unlawful threats.
Firstly, it should be noted that the fact that a person feels threatened is an im-
manent feature of a threat as a social phenomenon. This constatation alone does 




the characteristics of a threat and the legislative direction should be chosen. Since 
bridging the legal gap can be an example of using analogy, it should be considered 
whether such interpretation is not detrimental to the defendant, which would make 
it inadmissible in criminal law. The above analysis of the legal situation of the de-
fendant (also when attempting a prohibited act) can lead to a conclusion that such 
interpretation does not aggravate the legal situation of the defendant. A different 
conclusion should be drawn about the interpretation in which causing a justified 
fear that a threat will be carried out is not required in threats to commit a criminal 
offence under Article 245 or Article 197 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Such functional 
interpretation means – as a consequence of assuming the formal character of an 
offence – that the act is qualified as committed at the stage of behaviour, which 
would be considered as merely an attempt if linguistic interpretation were used.
What is more, differentiating threats with respect to different types of protected 
legal interests (i.e. individual and public) raises more doubts. The interpretation 
emphasising the primary importance of public legal interests and consequently 





excluding causing a justified fear that the threat will be carried out leads de facto to 
excluding individual legal interest from protection under Article 245 of the Criminal 
Code. It should be noted that, in line with the judicial decision, the group of the 
aggrieved persons is limited by the set of statutory features of a prohibited act22. As 
in the second concept causing a justified fear does not belong to statutory features, 
but is considered additionally, such interpretation would lead to accepting the lack of 
direct protection of individual legal interests by the provision. Applying such inter-
pretation has further consequences. Removing causing a justified fear that the threat 
will be carried out from statutory features of a criminal offence under Article 245 
would have to be connected with a cumulative qualification of this behaviour jointly 








carried out can be a statutory feature under Article 245 of the Criminal Code cannot 
be excluded, in particular when corrective interpretation is taken into account. This 
standpoint is supported by the interpretation of the definition of an unlawful threat 
under Article 115 § 12 of the Criminal Code in the light of the interpretation inten-
tionally excluding the fragment of the legislative text referenced in the provision. 
Therefore, using creative interpretation supported by corrective interpretation is 
necessary. Such an approach will lead to obtaining a full set of statutory features 
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